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I. THE NATURE OF AIR RISKS
Examples:
When, in 1919, a blimp fell through he roof of a La Salle
Street bank it seemed prophetic. Aviation was just beginning to
feel the stimulus of wartime invention when it was vividly demon-
strated that there was danger, grave danger, to men and their
property on the ground. And, although the fact that there have
been no similar catastrophes of so tragic a consequence has some-
what restored the placidity of the property owner, yet in the avia-
tion industry the fear persists that some night a flaming plane may
burn up a city as completely as did Mrs. O'Leary's lantern (although
it is doubtful that a modern city with its steel construction would
be combustible). If that occurs the airplane operator will be bound
hand and foot by restrictive legislation and the growth of air
transportation will be stunted.
Not that this is the operator's only perturbation. Today he is
alarmed also by the magnitude of the verdicts that are being
awarded to passengers injured in air disasters. A lay jury is
admittedly an enigmatic body and there is little predicting its de-
cisions, especially in personal injury actions. Nevertheless, one may
not recall too phlegmatically verdicts that totalled $89,000 which
were returned against the Colonial Western Airways when a tri-
motored plane crashed, killing fourteen people.' Nor is this case
unique.. Two months later a plane owned by the Northwest Air-
ways fell and injured five passengers. A jury gave one of the
passengers $35,000 and another $25,000.2 Other claims arising
from this accident were settled out of court for an estimated
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1. Hagymasi v. Colonial Western Airways, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 73 (Su-
preme Ct., Essex County, Apr. 10, 1931). On appeal to the N. J. Supreme
Ct. there was a remittitur of $15,000 on the $46,000 verdict given for the
death of William Steever (232 C. C. H. 2089. Decided Oct. 10, 1932).
2. Foot v. Northwest Airways, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 66 (U. S. D. C., Dist.
of Minn., 3d Div., Apr., 1930).
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$32,000.8 In June of 1932 a verdict of $25,000 was found against
the Curtis-Wright Flying Service for the death of a passenger
killed by the propellor of the plane from which he had just alighted. 4
No transport company is large enough or strongly rooted enough to
bear these liabilities lightly.5
Obviously, with the increasing safety of flying, such accidents
will become relatively less frequent. While in 1927 the passenger
death rate in scheduled flying was .12 per thousand flights, by
1931 it had shrunk to .05, and in that time there was an increase
of from 8,679 to 522,345 passengers carried.6  But the distressing
effect of individual accidents both upon the public and upon avia-
tion must continue. And, although flying will become more ac-
cepted by the casual passenger, yet the danger to persons and
property on the ground will increase with the increase in the num-
ber of airplanes.
The Causes of Air Risks:
Since this discussion is concerned mainly with (1) the risk
to the property owner, and (2) the risk to the air passenger, it
seems well to examine the causes of accidents from those separate
points of view.
(1) As Affecting the Property Owner-It is apparent that
the danger to the property owner may not be easily computed, since
every plane that passes over his head is a possible hazard to him.
For an accurate estimate, all accidents should be investigated,
whether they involve the huge airliners of the transport companies
3. "Recent Ruling Affect Passenger Liability Insurance," 2 Skylines 19,
22 (Mlay, 1931).
4. Williamson v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 133
Tex. bist. Ct., 14th Jud. Dist.).,
5. "If an airplane falls-an all too frequent occurrence-and damages
either a thing or person transported or destroys a thing or person on the
ground, the responsibility of the proprietor or operator will sometimes be so
immensd that even the largest enterprise is ruined because of a single acci-
dent." Ambrosini, "Caratteristiche fondamentall della responsabilit& aero-
nautica," 1928 II Dirritto Aeronautico 296, 306.





These statistics are based on Department of Commerce figures. The death
rate for passengers carried for hire in non-scheduled commercial flying has
been somewhat higher; thus:
1929 (last six months)-.03
1930 (entire year) -. 30
1931 (entire year) -. 25
Deaths of passengers in pleasure flying were:
1929 (last six months)-.35
1930 (entire year) -. 30
1931(entire year) -. 25
See Accident Statistics-Fourth Report of the Committee on Aviation of
the Actuarial Society of America, September, 1932 (N. Y.).
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
or the smaller planes of private flyers. 7  Since 1928 aviation acci-
dents have been reviewed by the Department of Commerce, whose
statistics for miscellaneous flying (all civil aviation except sched-
uled air transport) reveal that personal fallibility probably accounts
for one-half or more of all such accidents." This is significant
then, since there is reason to believe that miscellaneous flying is a
far greater threat to the man on the ground than scheduled air
transport." It supplies, at least, a working hypothesis.
(2) As Affecting the Air Passenger-The term air passenger
is here used to refer only to those who make use of scheduled air
transport. Of four hundred and forty accidents on scheduled air
lines, which occurred throughout the United States from January,
1928, to December, 1931, the Department of Commerce has so
analyzed the causes:10
(1) Pilot's error in judgment"l 8.55
(2) Poor technique and disobedience of
orders 6.79
7. Or army or navy planes. However, this discussion is confined to prob-lems of civil aviation, to those liabilities which arise as a result of an acci-dent injuring the person or property of a party on the ground, or injuring the
person of a passenger. It does not consider the liability of an air line toits employees, nor liabilities arising from the collision of two airplanes, nor
any liabilities resulting from the operation of lighter-than-air craft nor theliability of a transport company as the carrier of goods or baggage. These
matters will be reviewed in a later and larger study.
8. See 2 Air Commerce Bulletin 555, and 3 Air Commerce Bulletin 220
and 467. It is impossible to give an accurate determination of the risk topersons and property on the ground; since so much of what is termed mis-
cellaneous flying, especially student and experimental flying, is done over an
airport, so that a reported accident does not necessarily mean that any third
party was endangered.
For continental analyses of the risks see Blum, Assurances Ariennes,
p. 76 (Paris, 1930), and Prochasson, Le Risque de L'AIr (Paris, 1931), p. 36.
For a comparison of the air risks with the other risks, see Proc-hasson, p. 41
and note. For an analysis of various airplane risks, see Sweeney, The Na-ture and Development of Aviation Insurance (Philadelphia, 1927), pp. 41-53.
9. Obviously this is true because there are more private and non-sched-
uled commercial planes than there are scheduled air transports, and these
planes have a much higher accident rate.Yet it should be remembered that although the personal factor may be
more important in those accidents which affect third parties on the ground,
that does not necessarily indicate that negligence is present in those cases.
In determining negligence the courts are accustomed to take into considera-
tion the training and ability of a pilot. Thus a pilot holding a private license
would not be subjected to the same standard of care as a pilot holding a trans-
port license. See Greunke v. North American Airways, 201 Wis.- 565, 230
N. W. 618 (1930). and cases cited.
10. These statistics were compiled from several tables published by theDepartment of Commerce, 2 Air Commerce Bulletin 286 and 3 Air Commerce
Bulletin 140, 406. These statistics are for all accidents, minor and important,
so that they should not be taken too seriously in the present study. Certain
of the causes listed may be responsible for many minor accidents, rarely for
major ones. Nor would there likely be any agreement as to what constituted
negligence between the Department of Commerce and the courts. These
statistics were gathered independently of the verdicts in the cases arisingfrom the accidents; probably there is considerable discrepancy between the
results found by courts and juries and those which the Department of Com-
merce reports. This possible disagreement would, however, merely substan-
tiate the proposition that the courts are not competent to establish the cause
of airplane accidents with any degree of accuracy.
11. An honest error in judgment is not negligence at law. This was
specifically pointed out by Lawrence, Ct. J., in his instructions to the jury In
ConkUn v. Curtiss Flying Service (N. J. S. C., 1930), 1930 U. S. Av. R. 192.
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(3) Pilot's carelessness 5.86
(4) Supervisory errors 2.17
(5) Airport terrain and other causes 12.73
(6) Handling qualities, instruments and
miscellaneous causes 6.94
(7) Weather and darkness 27.63
(8) Power plant and structural failure 25.14
(9) Undetermined causes 4.19
% 100.00
The first five of these causes would probably be considered
negligence at law. The sixth cause, since it concerns the design
of the plane, might mean that the manufacturer would be held
liable.'" The seventh cause, which is responsible for one-fourth
of the accidents, by definition, "includes all accidents resulting from
conditions . . . which could not reasonably have been foreseen
and avoided."' 18 The eighth cause, motor and structural failure,
responsible for another one-fourth, may or may not result from
negligence, but negligence in such a case is practically impossible
of proof or disproof.
II. THE BEARING OF AIR RISKS
By Whom Should These Risks Be Borne f-Diverse Theories:
(1) By the Landowner-Although the landowner may now
insure himself against the air risk no one has yet had the temerity
to suggest that he alone should bear the expense of any damage
to himself or his property from airplanes. He is subjected to a
novel risk by aviation which he has done nothing to incur. In
fact, several writers have suggested that the flight of an airplane
across his property is a trespass. 4  It has however been frequently
and vigorously asserted that the aviator should be held responsible
only for that damage which is the result of his negligent act.'"
Whether or not the tactical advantage of res ipsa loquitur should
12. On the doctrine of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 11
N. E. 1050 (1916).
13. 3 Air Commerce Bulletin 404 (1932).
14. See Zollmann, "Air Space Rights," 53 Am. Law Rev. 711 (1919)
"Trespass by Airplane," 32 Harv. Law Rev. 569 (1919); Mathys, "Trespass
in the Air," 2 Wis. Law Rev. 58 (1922).
15. Cooper, "Aircraft Liability to Persons and Property on the Ground,"
17 A. B. A. Jour. 435 (1931); Davis, "Liability of Aircraft Carriers, Owners
and Operators of Aircraft," 18 Georgetown Law Jour. 241 (1930); "Aerial
Navigation," 15 Law Notes 86 (1911); Hotchkiss, Aviation Law, pp. 39-43(N. Y.; Baker Voorhis & Co., 1928) ; Shearman and Redfleld, Negligence (6th
ed., 1913), Sec. 653(f); Schneider, "Negligence In the Law of Aviation," 12
Boston Univ. Law Rev. 17 (1932); Stites, "Negligence in the Operation of
Aircraft," 18 Ky. Law Jour. 141 (1930).
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be given the property owner is a question upon which there is
little agreement.16
(2) By the Passenger-The question of whether the pas-
senger should be compelled to assume the entire risk of flight is
contingent upon the ability of the operator legally to contract away
his liability. If the scheduled air transport is considered a private
carrier then to a certain extent he may do so, but it seems very
unlikely that it will escape the classification of common carrier.' 7
And a common carrier is held to the highest degree of care for
the safety of passengers carried.
(3) By the Plane Operator-In contrast to those jurists who
would place all the risks of airplane activity upon the non-par-
ticipant are those who would hold the aviator and transport com-
pany alone responsible."" These theorists would have it that he
who engages in aviation should do so at his peril, that he should
not subject innocent parties to the hazards of an enterprise upon
which he voluntarily embarks and from which he alone profits.
The aviator is better able to predict damage to parties on the
ground than are those parties, and certainly, they maintain, he
should provide compensation for injuries to passengers when he
undertakes to carry those passengers safely.
The Allocation of the Risks by the Existing Law:
this whole range of theory is exemplified in present statutes
and court law, a survey of which may at least reveal the need for
international uniformity.
(1) Foreign Jurisprudence-
(a) As to Third Parties-An examination of European
legislation and decisions shows a consistent opinion that the air-
plane owner should be absolutely liable for what damage he causes
16. Schneider. supra note 15; Knauth, "Limitation of Aircraft Owners'
Liability," 3 Air Law Re'. 134 (1932) ; and see note 37.
17. Edmunds, "Aircraft Passenger Ticket Contracts," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 321 (1930) ; Fixel, "The Law of Aviation" (Albany, 1927), Chap XI, p.
84; Greer, "The Civil Liability of an Aviator as a Carrier of Goods and Pas-
sengers," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 241 (1930) ; Hotchkiss, supra, note 15, Chap.
8, p. 51; Rdsenbaum, "Regulation of Aircraft as Common Carriers," 3 JOURNAL
OF AiR LAW 194 (1932).
18. Bogert, "Problems in Aviation Law," 6 Corn. Law Quart. 271, 302
(1921) ; Hazeltine, The Law of the Air (London, 1911), p. 86; Logan, Air-
craft Law-Made Plain (St. Louis, 1928) ; Spaight, Aircraft in Peace and
the Law (London, 1919), p. 78 ; Swift. "Present and Proposed Aerial Legis-
lation," 18 Case and Comment 134 (1911) ; McCracken, "Air Law," 57 Am.
Law Rev. 97 (1923) ; Newman, "Damage Liability in Aircraft Cases," 29
Columbia Law Rev. 1039 (1929) ; Kuhn, "The Beginnings of an Aerial Law,"
4 Am. Jour. of Int. Law 109; Zollmann, "Liability of Aircraft," 53 Am. Law
Rev. 879 (1919). A qualified liability based on the doctrine expressed in
Wilson v. Phoenix Powder Co., 40 W. Va. 413, 21 S. E. 1035 (1895), was
proposed by Mr. Julian Hearne in "The Liability of an Aviator for Damage
to Persons and Property on the Ground," 37 'W. Va. Law Quart. 269 (1931).
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to persons and property on the surface of the ground.19 Differ-
ences exist as to the persons responsible, whether the owner alone,
the owner and the operator together, or the operator alone (if he
uses the plane unknown to the owner). The Hungarian law speci-
fies that force majeure does not exempt the owner or operator
from liability, while the Italian law states definitely that it does,
and the English, Danish and French laws, although expressly ad-
mitting contributory negligence as an exonerating condition, yet
suggest by their silence that force majeure is not similarly re-
garded. The German law has established definite maximum limits
of responsibility, while Spain holds such liability unlimited and Italy
permits the owner to leave the plane as payment for what damage
it has caused in those instances where the damage is not the fault
of the owner.
(b) As to Passengers-Continental definitions of pas-
senger liability are, however, less consistent. In France, while
asserting that the liabilty is contractual, the courts, by permitting
all but liability for negligence to be bargained away, have in effect
restricted it to the confines of a tort formula. 20  Similarly in
Poland there can be no contracting away of responsibility for
negligence; neither can there be recovery for more han 20,000
slotys.21  In England clauses of full exoneration are held valid, 22
as they also are in Austria and Hungary. These latter countries,
however, require a formal acceptation by the passenger of these
conditions.2  German legislators, by the Act of August 1, 1922,
created absolute liability, mollified by a statutory limitation of
damages. Under this provision German air transport companies
have made good use of non-responsibility clauses. 24 Italy has bor-
rowed a device from maritime law and, while declaring clauses re-
stricting liability to be void, has provided that, unless the fault of
the operator be demonstrated, he will be responsible only to the
value of the plane. 25 Switzerland, likewise frowning upon attempts
of the operator to restrict his liability by contract, has approached
strict liability; yet, by the Swiss law, there is retained in the judge
19. See Blum, op. cit. note 8, on pp. 320-322; and Prochasson, op. cit.
note 8, pp. 117-149.
20. Kaftal. La Reparation des Dommages Causes aux Voyageurs dans les
Transports A~riens (Paris, 1930), p. 3 et seq.
21. Prochasson, op. cit. note 8, p. 120 et seq.
22. McCawley v. Furness Ry. Co., 8 Q. B. 57 (1872) ; and see Nokes and
Bridges. The Law of Aviation (London, 1930), p. 106.
23. Prochasson, op. cit. note 8, p. 120 et seq.
24. L v. Aero Lloyd A. G. und H., 56 Juristische Wochenschrift 2210(translated in 1 JOURNAL OF Am LAW 223) ; and Z v. S, 1 Zeltschrift fitr das
Gesamte Luftrecht 196 (translated in 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 220).
26. Prochasson, op. cit. note 8, p. 131. This law has not been universally
liked. For discussions and criticisms of it see Cortesariez, La Responsabillt nel
Diritto Aereo (Torino, 1929) p. 65; Ambrosini, "Caratteristiche Fondamentali
della Responsabllith Aeronautica," 5 II Diritto Aeronautico 296 (1928).
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the power to grant exoneration .2  Russia alone of all the European
nations has established absolute liability, and that has not been
done unequivocally. There the clear statement of absolute liability
in Article 22 of the decree of the Counsel of Commissaires of the
People (January 17, 1921) was modified by the Civil Code of
January 1, 1923 (Article 404), to declare force majeure and grave
contributory negligence factors of exoneration. What is here meant
by force majeure is not entirely clear,27 but certainly the liability
seems severe until one remembers that the transport companies
are all creations of the state.
(2) American Jurisprudence-
(a) As to Third Parties-In the United States, Section
Five of the Uniform Aeronautics Act provided for absolute lia-
bility upon the owner of aircraft for injuries to persons and prop-
erty on the land unless the injury was caused in whole or in part
by the negligence of the person injured. This was approximately
the law established by the British Air Navigation Act of 1920 and
recommended in the Code Internationale Navigation Adrienne of
1919. Section five was adopted by seventeen of the twenty-one
states which adopted the Uniform Aeronautics Act.28 Arizona,
however, preferred to place liability upon a negligence basis;2"
26. Prochasson, op. cit. note 8, p. 135.
27. Force inajeure in the French law is not synonomous with "Act of
God," for it may mean an act of a third party as well. Thus in an English
case where these words were questioned, Bailache, J., said: "I have had the
evidence of a Belgian lawyer as to their meaning, and he said the words are
understood on the Continent to mean 'causes which you cannot prevent and
for which you are not responsible:' " Matsoukis v. Priestman and Co., 1 K.
B. 681, 686 (1915). See also Lebeaupi v. Crispin, 2 K. B. 714 (1920), and
Hackney Borough Council v. Dore, 1 K. B. 431 (1922). For the distinction
between vis major and "Act of God," see Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P. Div. 423,
429 (1876).
Discussing the application of the words force majeure to airplane cases,
Prof. Ripert has said: "The law does not give any definition of the words.
If one means them in a large sense, the responsibility of the transporter is
attenuated until in a very great number of cases, it is only necessary to estab-
lish that the accident resulted from a risk which he could not forsee. If,
on the other hand, one gives a restrictive sense to the expression, the trans-
porter will be nearly always responsible, for he will not be able to prove
the existence of an exonerating fact": Ripert, "La Force Majeure dans les
Transports A6riens," 12 Rev. Juridique de la Locomotion A~riene 1 (1928).
Prof. Ripert suggested that atmospheric conditions and defects in the apparatus
should not be considered by the French law as cases of force majeure to free
the transporter from liability to passengers, nor, he insisted, should his re-
sponsibility towards third persons be at all alleviated by force majeure. Ap-
parently there is much to be said for Professor iirschberg's identification offorce majeure with the Anglo-American "proximate cause": Hirschberg, "The
Liability of the Aviator to Third Persons," 2 So. Cal. Law Rev. 409 (1929).
If. then, the French idea of force majeure was intended here it will be
seen that the code did little to modify the previous decree. It is possible,
however, that in Russia the phrase may be given a more extended significance.
III any event the liability is severe and the explanation of this severity is
that the transport companies are creations of the state.
28. Idaho in 1931 repealed the Uniform Act and adopted a provision
copying the Pennsylvania law.
29. L. 1929, Ch. 38, Sec. 11. Arizona also by a regulation of its Corpo-
ration Commission, has provided compulsory insurance for aircraft common
carriers; Ariz. Corp. Comm., Gen. Order 113L, Nov. 10, 1928. For similar
action in New Mexico, see New Mexico Aircraft Common Carrier Regulations,
1930, Mar. 17, 1930, cited in Kremlick, "A Survey of Aviation Insurance Law,"
2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAw 529 (1931).
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Pennsylvania provided that usual tort law should govern,8 0 and
Connecticut passed legislation worded like that of Arizona.31 A
Louisiana law, passed in 1926, provides that "it shall be the duty
of every person, firm, or corporation engaged in the business of
operating aeroplanes, whether as owner, lessee or otherwise, for
the purpose of carrying passengers for hire in this State to pro-
-cure and execute an indemnity bond . . . with a good and
solvent surety company . . . with the obligation running in
favor of any person who may be injured in person or property"
by an aeroplane.8 2 For the first plane the bond is to be fifteen
thousand dollars and for each additional plane one thousand dol-
lars. Similarly, a regulation of the State Corporation Commission
of Virginia forbids any "operator of commercial aircraft used for
intrastate flights" to "engage in commercial aviation in Virginia
without having first obtained liability and property damage insur-
ance."
8
(b) As to Passengers-American legislation has not
shown so much interest in the passenger risk. In most states it
is tacitly assumed that the ordinary rule of negligence which ap-
plies to accidents on the ground applies quite as efficaciously in the
air. The opinion of the early writers8 4 that the airplane was a
"dangerous instrumentality" under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher
5
is now given little approbation. Courts worry constantly over the
application of res ipsa loquitur37 And, meanwhile, the passenger
is blithely unaware of his rights; for only Arizona and Connecticut
have given legislative acknowledgement to this common law lia-
bility,38 and only Louisiana and Virginia have expressly altered
the common law."
Absolute Liability:
(1) The Necessity for Absolute Liability-The law, con-
fronted with unusual obstacles, all too often chooses the course
of least resistance. Stated less figuratively, judges and legislators
30. L. 1929, Act 317, Sec. 6.
31. Pub, Acts, 1929, Chap. 253, Sec. 32.
32. L. 1926, Act No. 52.
33. Cited in Fagg, "Survey of State Aeronautical Legislation," 1 JOR-
NAL OF AIR LAW 475 (1930).
34. Hazeltine. op. cit., p. 85; Spaight, op. cit., p. 76.
35. Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
36. Hotchkiss, op. cit., p. 40; Zollinann, Law of the Air (Milwaukee,
1927) p. 77.
37. See Allison v. Standard Air Lines (No. 3516, U. S. D. C., S. D. Cal.,
Cent. Div., Sept. 19, 1930) ; Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Serv., 231 App. Div.
867, 247 N. Y. Supp. 251 (1930) ; Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport. 180 N. E.
212 (1932). See also Allen, "Transportation by Air and Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur," 16 A. B. A. Jour. 455 (1930) ; and Harper, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in
Air Law," 1 Air Law Rev. 478 (1930).
38. See supra, notes 29 and 31.
39. See supra, notes 32 and 33.
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have a penchant for interpreting novel situations in the light of
old precepts. And so, although the airplane is unique and the legal
problems which it raises are extraordinary, there has been no calm
and realistic consideration of a new law. Rather, jurists have been
content to apply awkward analogies and to decide air problems
by trial and error. By such means the legal tailors will eventually
clothe aviation, but these handed-down garments will never fit very
gracefully or comfortably.
Fault liability, or, more especially, liability for negligence, is
founded upon two or three presuppositions. It is necessary to
assume, for example, that negligence, if it exist, can be proved by
the injured party. But suppose that a transport plane catches
fire in the air and crashes dismally into a farm house. The pas-
sengers and pilot are killed, the plane is destroyed, the farmhouse
is burned to the ground.40 First, an action is begun by the farmer
for the loss of his property. With recovery posited upon a neg-
ligence basis, what are his chances? The pilot is dead, the ma-
chine is destroyed, and who is to say with any degree of certainty
just what circumstance or combination of circumstances precipi-
tated the crash? If any of the passengers survive, their testimony
is muddled and of little value because they are usually quite ignor-
ant of the workings of airplanes. Likewise any observer on the
ground may give only a garbled and half-credible account of the
behavior of the plane in the air before and during the crash.
Expert witnesses are called in, so many by each side. Detailed
'hypothetical questions are put to them, constructed from the testi-
mony of eye-witnesses and of those who examined the wreckage.
The jury is left to decide the relative plausibilities of the specu-
lations of the experts. The resultant justice cannot be of a very
high quality.
But suppose it is the representative of a deceased passenger
who brings the action. Is he in any better position than the
farmer? Certainly the situation is not helped greatly by the ap-
plication of res ipsa loquitur, since even in such a case the trans-
port company may bring in experts and technical arguments to
befuddle an already hopelessly perplexed jury into believing that
no element of negligence could have existed. Expensive litigation,
imperfect conjecture, and little protection to the public will as-
suredly not be banished by the muttering of a Latin phrase.
40. Not that such accidents often occur. A plane even with a dead motor
may usually be piloted to the ground with safety. But it is believed that
the increase in the number of planes will more than keep pace with the in-
crease in airplane safety, and that this kind of accident must become more
common. The law may well be prepared for such occurrences.
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A writer in a law journal, himself the head of an air transport
company, details his experiences with two cases in which the fact
situations were apparently identical. In one case the jury found
negligence and assessed heavy damages; the other case the judge
dismissed because obviously no negligence was present. One comes
of necessity to recognize the fact that the courts as they are now
constituted are quite unequipped to handle questions which require
such specialized information as the technical cause of an airplane
catastrophe. Ex post facto guesses make pleasant enough reading
in detective stories, but they are very makeshift bases for justice.
Add the confusing detail of a lay jury and there is no wonder
that the results are palpably inconsistent.4 1
This is taking for granted that negligence is the cause of most
airplane disasters. In the early part of this discussion, the Depart-
ment of Commerce statistics as to the causes of accidents were
reviewed, and it was shown in what a large percentage of cases the
Department had found no negligence. Who then is to pay for the
damage in such cases? Assuming what is obviously impossible,
that juries could determine negligence quite as accurately as could
the unprejudiced examination of a body of experts, assuming, in
other words, that the negligence liability could be almost perfectly
administered, yet what comfort would it be to a farmer left home-
less by the fall of an airplane or to a family left without support
by the same crash, to know that the operator of the plane had not
been careless? It can certainly not be said of the farmer that he
has assumed the air risk, for he has done no affirmative act which
might be so construed, neither does he profit by aviation. Nor
should it be said of the passenger that he has assumed le risque
de l'air, as a contemporary French writer 42 has denominated the
accident causes not ascribable to negligence. The airplane differs
from every other carrier in the extent to which it is endangered
by purely external phenomena, by fog4 s or wind overtaking the
41. When considerable time elapses between the accident and the trial,
there is the danger that the jury will view the accident in the light of con-
temporary standards. Accidents today which seem unavoidable may, because
of the progress of aviation technique, seem tomorrow to be gross negligence.
On the difficulties of proof in airplane accidents, see Irnbrecq, "Garanties
Necessalres," 10 Rev. Juridique de Ia Locomotion A6rienne 275 (1926).
42. Prochasson, op. cit. note 8.
43. On importance of fogginess, see Scheduled Aviation Mortality Accord-
ing to Fogginess of Terrain:
Number of Foggy Days per Year
Period-1929-1931 Under 5 5-10 10-20 Over 20
Passenger Miles (thousands) 42,297 72,635 66,327 49,943
Fatal Accidents 2 5 6 5
Fatal Accident Rate per
100,000 Passengers Miles 4.7 6.9 9.0 10.
In Aviation Statistics-4th Report of Committee on Aviation of the Ac-
tuarial Society of America, Sept., 1932 (N. Y.), p. 9.
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pilot in flight, or by the advent of sudden darkness. To hold that
the passenger has assumed the risk of such conditions is to make
an air journey a truly dangerous undertaking.
The concept of fault liability is not so fundamental to the law
as has been assumed, 4 and modern legal philosophy has accepted
the fact that in the present day it is not always adequate.45  With
civilization becoming increasingly complex, there must inevitably
be more accidents of a quite unavoidable nature. 6 In these days
of corporate activity, it should not be heresy to suggest that in
certain situations parties should be held to pay for damage even
though they have not themselves caused that damage.47 A French
school of philosophy has given this modern idea of liability an
intelligent doctrinal foundation.4 8  Nowhere is it more applicable
than in the case of the airplane.49
(2) The Constitutionality of Absolute Liability-The event-
44. Wigmore, Select Essays In Anglo-American Legal History (Boston,
1909), Vol. 3, p. 474.
45. "There is a strong and growing tendency, where there is no blame
on either side, to ask, In view of the exigencies of social justice who can best
bear the loss, and hence to shift the loss by creating liability where there is
no fault": Pound, "The End of the Law," 27 Harv. Law Rev. 233 (1914).
"Strict liability Is not out of place as a prevailing judicial policy when
perceived as an antidote for the new hazards of life In twentieth century
America. As the problems of public order multiply, would we not establish
a social policy more conducive to the protection and promotion of the best
interests of modern society if our rules of liability required every actor who
causes injury to Justify his conduct?" Harris, "Liability Without Fault," 6
Tulane Law Rev. 337 (1932).
"It is to be asked if this principle (liability without fault), new and fair
for forty centuries, has not served its time, and if today, in a very different
cultural and economic scene, it would not be the time to abandon it": Kaftal,
op. cit. note 20, p. 40.
46. "As civilization advances and society becomes more complex, the points
of contact between man and man multiply at an exceedingly rapid pace. An almost
infinite number of novel situations arise in which the activities of a person
or groups must be regulated to insure the proper protection of others": Harris,
op. cit., p. 343.
"Certain classes of undertakings are always attended with an unavoid-
able damage. Such an unavoidable damage may be minimized by extraordinary
care, but can never be entirely prevented. . . . The basis of liability seems
to be chiefly economic. It is mainly in this class of expectable yet unavoid-
able, harms that the device of imposing a higher degree of- care is inade-
quate:" Takayanagi, "Liability Without Fault in the Modern Civil and Com-
mon Law," 16 Il1. Law Rev. 163, 173 (1921).
47. "Fault is always personal-it is that of an engineer, of a motor-
man, of an inspector-but the money that goes in these cases to make good
the fault Is the money of the stockholders who constitute the company . ..
Under the present rules the conduct of one man or set of men is elaborately
investigated in order to determine and fix the liability of another man or set
of men:" Ballantine, "A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims,"
29 Harv. Law Rev. 705 (1916).
48. Duguit, Les Transformations G6n6rales du Droit Prv6 (Paris, 1912).
For a succinct statement of this theory see an article, "Fault, Risk, and Ap-
portionment of Loss," by Prof. Demogue in 13 I1. Law Rev. 155 (1918).
While this is strictly no rationalization for absolute liability, yet it does fur-
nish a basis for the sort of collective responsibility here recommended in
aviation cases. Thus, since the public demands an enterprise and participates
in it, it should bear part of the risk. Taking account of insurance the[ risk
may legally be placed on the aviator up to a certain fixed maximum because
the aviator is better able to insure than the public. This effects a division
of the risk in accord with the economic actualities of today.
49. For a discussion of the sociological foundation of an absolute lia-
bility to persons on the ground, see Hirschberg, "The Liability of the Aviator
to Third Persons," 2 So. Cal. Law Rev. 405 (1929).
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ful history of Section Five of the Uniform Aeronautics Act5"
illustrates that persistent doubt as to constitutionality which has
opposed all absolute liability legislation that has been enacted in
this country. The cases most frequently cited to support an asser-
tion of unconstitutionality are two decisions of Mr. Justice Butler,
Manley v. Georgia51 and Western & Atlantic Railroad Company
v. Henderson.5 2  In the first of these cases, the Supreme Court
held invalid a Georgia statute which provided that every insolvency
of a bank should be presumed fraudulent in the absence of any
showing to the contrary by the defendant directors. The Court
was of the opinion that the statute created a presumption which
was arbitrary and, hence, violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the second case, another Georgia statute, establishing a pre-
sumption for the plaintiff in any action for injuries done to per-
sons or property by a railroad, was also held unconstitutional in
that such a presumption, having no rational basis, was contrary to
fact and in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.
But analysis will reveal the fact that cases involving statutory
presumptions, especially those involving rebuttable presumptions,"
are not authorities for the illegality of absolute liability. The pre-
sumption of the Western & Atlantic Railroad Case, for instance,
was devised to assist the railroad passenger in proving negligence;
it had the effect of creating an inference which was given the
"effect of evidence. '54  But specifically, it did not abrogate neg-
ligence; it was merely an attempt to substitute "legislative fiat"
for "fact." The purpose of the court in invalidating the statute
was to keep its theory intact and not to confuse the functions of
the legislature and the judiciary.
Another objection made to Section Five was that the imposi-
tion of a money judgment based upon its violation would be taking
property without due process of law, inasmuch as it denied to
the defendant operator such common law defenses as Act of God
and absence of negligence. 5 Mr. Chief Justice Waite in Munn
v. Illinois5  observed that
50. The absolute liability provision of Section Five has been finally re-
tained in the Uniform Aeronautical Code with the re-definition of the word
"owner." See Advance Program of the American Bar Association 1931, p. 47,
and "Report of the Standing Committee on Aeronautical Law of the American
Bar Association," 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 632, 633, 644 (1932).
51. 279 U. S. 1; 49 S. Ct. 215 (1929).
52. 279 U. S. 639; 49 S. Ct. 445 (1929).
53. A_ conclusive presumption Is really a rule of substantive law, "the
effect of which is to render immaterial to the issue the 'presumed' fact." The
rebuttable presumptions of these two cases are quite different: Brosman,
"The Statutory Presumption," 5 Tulane Law Rev. 178, 209 (1931).
54. On p. 644.
55. Osterhout. "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Avia-
tion," 2 Air Law Rev. 9 (1931).
56. 94 U. S. 113, 24 L, Ed. 77. (1876).
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"A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the com-
mon law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more
sacred than any other. Rights of property which have been created by the
common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself,
as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will . . . of the legislature,
unless prevented by Constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed,
and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances." 57
This statement was cited by Mr. Justice Van Devanter in Mondou
v. N. Y., N. H., and H. Ry. Co."" in answer to the contention that
the restriction of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
and the abrogation of the fellow-servant rule by the Employer's
Liability Act were violations of the Fifth Amendment.
Absolute liability, unambiguously stated, has been upheld on
numerous occasions by state courts and by the Supreme Court of
the United States. The historic example is that of the railroad
fire cases. In St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 5 the Supreme
Court, after a full discussion of the questions involved, held con-
stitutional a Missouri statute which imposed absolute liability upon
railroads for damage to property owners along the right of way
from fire caused by sparks from locomotives. In Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Humes,6 0 the same court had previously held valid a statute re-
quiring railroad companies to fence off their lines and making them
liable for all damage to cattle from failure to comply. Owners
have been made responsible for damage done by their dogs to
sheep even when there was no scienter,"1 and the absolute liability
of common carriers for damage to goods has been firmly rooted
in the law since the early eighteenth century. 2 The Supreme Court
in the case of Chicago Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Zernecke6 3 upheld a statute providing that railroads should be
strictly accountable for injuries to passengers, for the reason that
the railroad had accepted the statute as a condition of incorpora-
tion; and in 1928 the California court held a company engaged
57. On p. 134.
58. 223 U. S. 1; 32 S. Ct. 169 (1912).
'59. 165 U. S. 1, 17 S. Ct. Rep. 243 (1896). Similar statutes were passed
in Maine, Connecticut, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Ok-
lahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and South Dakota. See Isaacs, "Fault
and Liability," 31 Harv. Law Rev. 954, 961 (1918). 'For other railroad fire
cases, see Freund, The Police Power (Chicago, 1904), p. 653, note 46.
60. 115 U. S. 512 (1885).
61. Holmes v. Myrray, 207 Mo. 413, 105 S. V. 1085 (1907). And see
a recent California statute (Stats. 1931, Ch. 503, p. 1095) which definitely
provides for absolute liability on the owner of the dog. This statute is dis-
cussed in Wood and Palucci, "Some Recent Statutory Changes in California
Rules of Civil Liability," 18 A. B. A. Jour. 782 (1932).
62. See Holmes, Common Law, p. 180 et seq. on Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Lord
Ray. 909, 918 (1702). See also Goddard, "The Liability of the Common Car-
rier as Determined by Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court,"
15 Col. Law Rev. 399 (1915).
63. 183 U. S. 582 (1902).
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in drilling an oil well fully responsible for damage to adjoining
property resulting from the "blowing out" of the well, although the
company was guilty of no negligence.6 4
Familiar cases involving an absolute liability are those cases
in which the employer is now held as an insurer for a limited class
of injuries caused to others which have resulted from no fault
of his.8 5 That the old rationalization of respondeat superior, based
upon the carelessness of the employer in selecting his workers, no
longer has any real existence is revealed in the fact that the care
exercised never becomes an issue in the case. s
But by far the most conspicuous examples of absolute liability
in the modern American law are the various Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts67 and the Federal Employer's Liability Acts.68 The
objection that such legislation is based upon the employer-employee
relation has been anticipated by the Supreme Court with the as-
sertion that it is the effect and not the source of the injury which
is the "criterion of Congressional power."69
These cases evidence only a few of the points at which objective
liability has encroached upon the negligence doctrine.70 But they
are at least sufficient to demonstrate that fault liability no longer
-nor ever really did have-a sacrosanct position in the law. Ab-
solute liability is not the thesis of impractical theorists; it is not
even merely a possibility; but it has an important existence in the
law of today. And it is the idea "which seems to be in accord
with modern social sentiment."' 71
64. Green v. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).
65. Mr. Arthur Ballantine has pointed out that an employer is now held
as an insurer for a limited class of injuries caused to others. Without fault
of his own he is required to pay. "A quasi insurer's liability, absolute lia-
bility, or liability without fault it Is, and liability of this character may, with-
out doing violations to_the body of principles of the common law of which
this principle forms a part, be extended to cover harm occurring in the
carrying on of the employer's enterprise through causes other than the single
misqhance of provable negligence." Ballantine, op. cit. note 47, p. 714.
66. Originally the master had the option of surrendering a delinquent
slave or of paying damages to appease the vengeance of the injured person.With the master ceasing to have a property interest in the slave the doctrine
took its present form on the basis of social expediency. See Wigmore, "Re-
sponsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History," 7 Harvard Law Review 330-337,
383. 405 (1894); Laski. "The Basis of Vicarious Liability," 26 Yale L. J.
105 '(1916). For the modern extension of vicarious liability to family automo-bile cases see Heyting, "Automobiles and Vicarious Liability," 16 A. B. A. J.
225 (1930).
67. For a case where liability was imposed upon the employer although
no one was at fault, see N. Y. Central By. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 S.
Ct. 247 (1917) ; for a case where liability was imposed for the fault of some-
one other than the employer, see Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249
U. S. 162 (1919).
68. See Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct.
169 (1912).
69. Ibid., p. 51.
70. For other cases of absolute liability, see The Report by the Committee
to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents (Philadelphia, 1932), Chap.
X.
71. "The principle that inevitable loss should be borne not by the per-
son on whom it may happen to fall, but by the person who profits by the
dangerous business to which the loss is incident, embodies a very intelligible
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III. THE DELEGATION OF AIR RISKS-COMPULSORY INSURANCE
Compulsory Insurance as a Substitute for Liability:
(1) Relation of Insurance to Absolute Liability--The ob-
jection, often made, that any system of absolute liability must place
a prohibitive burden upon the party held responsible would have
much greater force were it not for the existence of insurance. As
life grows more complex and men become increasingly interde-
pendent the need for certain enterprises is felt by society. To
place all the risks of these enterprises upon those who profession-
ally participate in them is to make the cost to society unduly high
and to cut down the effective use of the enterprises themselves.
Insurance offers itself as a practical solution. By requiring all
who make use of an enterprise to pay a scientifically determined
amount in sharing a portion of the risks of that enterprise, insur-
ance so diffuses the expenses of carrying the risks that the burden
is almost imperceptible upon any one party.
Thus absolute liability is the answer to the liability problem
raised by the airplane, and insurance is the answer to the risk-
bearing problem created by absolute liability. Let us refer to our
example of the air transport plane which crashed into the farm-
house. Suppose that at that time legislation was in effect enunci-
ating absolute liability towards persons on the ground and towards
passengers. Suppose also that the transport company had been
required to contract insurance indemnifying it for all liability suf-
fered by reason of injury either to persons on the ground or to
passengers. Now our hypothetical farmer, instead of wasting time
and money in a pathetic effort to prove negligence on the part of
the transport company, would have but to show the extent of his
damage and he would be compensated. Similarly, the representa-
tive of the deceased passenger would be required only to prove
that death was a result of the accident. In place of expensive,
slow, and uncertain court litigation there would be a quick and
efficient recompense.
The justice of imposing an obligation to insure upon the aviator
is founded, in the case of the man on the ground, on the circum-
stance that the aviator voluntarily engages in an activity which is
dangerous to third parties and from which he alone profits. In
the case of the passenger it is certainly no hardship for the trans-
port to carry insurance, since it is the passenger himself who ulti-
ldeN of Justice, and which seems to be in accord with modern social senti-
ment." Freund, Police Power (Chicago, 1904), p. 658.
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mately pays for it. 2 In either instance, the result is that the in-
jured party is given remuneration for his loss and that the trans-
port company is freed of obligation; in other words, insurance has
been substituted for liability.
(2) Compulsory Insurance as a Guarantee of Financial Cap-
ability-Compulsory insurance does more than merely make pos-
sible the maintenance of absolute liability; it guarantees that lia-
bility. Let us assume that our hypothetical farmer was given a
judgment against the transport company whose plane destroyed his
house; yet without a system of compulsory insurance, is there any
certainty that the judgment would have real value ?78 Let us
assume what is still more probable, 4 that the plane was not a
transport plane but the plane of a private, relatively inexperienced
flyer. The aviator, himself killed in the crash, leaves no estate but
the blown ashes of his second-hand airplane. At such a time,
absolute liability must be a phrase of little comfort unless it is
coupled with obligatory insurance. Likewise, of what value would
a judgment for the estate of the air passenger be if that judgment
were uncollectable? Compulsory insurance suggests itself as a
necessary guarantee of solvency in an industry which is still in
an adolescent state.
72. Loss for normal damage caused by operation Is clearly to be classed
as an operating expense. Courts have taken solemn notice of the realities
of the liability imposed upon carriers. Thus it has been said that there is no
hardshb in such a liability because "the price of transportation will include
a reasonable premium for this kind of liability." Moses v. Boston & Maine
R. R?., 24 N. H. 71, 85 (1854). "The pay of carriers Is graduated upon such
liability." Thomas v. Boston & Providence R. R. Corp., 10 Mete. 472, 476
(Mass., 1845).
73. "New operating companies are being organized and financed weekly.
Not all of them have the high standards referred to. Some of them are stock
selling enterprises. The leaders of some have had no experience and possess
no accurate knowledge of costs or of the business or technical side of air
transportation. Many of them are, or In the event of serious accident loss
would prove to be, potentially or actually Insolvent. Many are commencing
to operate wastefully in competition with established and experienced carriers,
possibly as a nuisance value maneuver. The Industry cannot fairly ask for
regulation to protect its interests in this regard and at the same time ob-
Ject to regulation to protect the interests of the public. Times and conditions
have changed." 0'Ryan, Limitation of Aircraft Liability, 3 Air Law Review
27 (1932).
The need for some system of compulsory insurance in airplane cases was
felt very early. In 1910 the International Congress to settle Rules for Air-
ship Voyages, meeting in Paris, recommended some form of security. That
same year, in the United States, Governor Baldwin was suggesting an act
which would provide for a bond of at least $1000 made payable to the United
States to be deposited with the Collector of Internal Revenue. This scheme
was referred to the American Bar Association's Committee on Jurisprudence
and Law Reform. See Baldwin, "Liability for Accidents in Aerial Naviga-
tion," 9 Mich. Law Rev. 20 (1910) and 36 A. B. A. Rep. 380. In 1911 a
German, Hans Sperl, suggested that registration be made a prerequisite
of flight and that registration be accompanied by entrance of the applicant
into an aviators' organization, dues of which should go into damage and in-
surance funds to be deposited in an international central office. Proof of
loss then would alone be necessary in order that a victim of an air accident
might be indemnified. This loss would be paid by the local society of avia-
tors who would locate the offending airplane and collect from the local so-
ciety of which the operator was a member. Sperl, "The Legal Side of Avia-
tion" (from the German) 23 Green Bag 398 (1911). For a somewhat later
plan see Myers, "The Air and the Earth Beneath," 26 Green Bag 363 (1914).
74. See supra, note 9.
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The Nature of Compulsory Insurance:
(1) The Form of Compulsory Insurance-Necessary Con-
ditions-
(a) Limitation of Liability-In the early pages of this
article, attention was called to the excessive verdicts courts were
now handing down against air transport companies in passenger
injury cases. The significance of these verdicts was that they in-
dicated the unpredictability of juries. Yet, if insurance is to be
substituted for liability, it is necessary that there be some pre-
conceived measure, or, at least, limit, of damages. In order that
insurance may be placed upon a safe and practical basis, it is sug-
gested, then, that there be fixed maximum limits of responsibility
in cases involving injury to third parties and to passengers 5.7  Thus,
in the case of injury to third parties the limit might well be placed
at $100,000 an accident.76  In the case of injury to passengers the
75. This idea is not new. Consider the Italian rule of the abandon,
Workmen's Compensation Statutes in the United States where injuries are
valued on a fixed scale, and finally the limitations contained in the death by
wrongful act statutes of some states. That a definite delimiting of possible
damages is desirable in order that insurance may be contracted at a reason-
able rate is obvious. One insurance company, interrogated by the author,
believed that "insurance against unlimited liability would be quite practicable
with proper cooperation on behalf of all aircraft markets." Another company
replied: "We doubt very much that insurance against all legal liability for
injuries to passengers and third parties in an unlimited amount is practical,
or in fact, possible under insurance laws of certain states. In some states,
in certain lines of casualty insurance, which we think would include aircraft,
an insurance company may not issue a policy in an amount which exceeds
10% of its capital and surplus. The question of unlimited insurance in con-
nection with automobile business has arisen from time to time and, entirely
apart from the question of desirability, has not been found practical or
possible."
The desirability for a uniform limitation of liability is also indisputable.
A writer in an aviation magazine has put the case of a plane flying from
Boston to Los Angeles which crashes and kills ten passengers. "If the crash
occurs in Massachusetts or Connecticut the liability would be limited by law
to $10,000 per passenger or $100,000 for all. In New York there is no limit
and a $50,000 verdict on the part of a jury for each passenger would not be
excessive, making a possible total liability of $500,000 on one machine. If
the crash occurred in New Jersey, Pennsylvania or Ohio, there is no limit in
law as to the amount of liability for each death. However, the verdicts pos-
sibly would be lower than those in and around New York City. If they
crash in Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, or Kansas, the limit of liability is $10,000
per person. In Colorado the limit is $5,000 per person or $50,000 for the
ten. Here we find a possible difference between the crash in Colorado and
the crash in New York, of $450,000. New Mexico, Arizona and California,
again, are unlimited. If on the other hand, the plane became lost in fog
and crashed just beyond the Mexican border, there would be absolutely no
liability even if the whole ten passengers were killed." Moray, "Insurance
and Aviation." 14 Acro Dig. 82 (1929).
The limitations proposed by the CITEJA at its Budapest meeting in Oc-
tober, 1930, are worthy of note. It was decided that the operator should be
liable to third persons only to the value of the aircraft at the time it was
first put in service. An amount equal to one-half of this value should be set
aside for the payment of damages for injury caused to persons and the other
half for payment of damages caused to property. In any case, the limit of
liability should not be less than 2,500,000 francs for each category of dam-
age, and if the amount set aside for damages to property is not entirely ex-
hausted the balance should be employed for the payment of damages to per-
sons. See Ambrosini, "Liability for' Damages Caused by Aircraft on the
Ground; a Proposed International Code." 3 Air Law Rev. 1 (1932).
See also, for the discussion of limitations at the CITEJA meeting, Compte
Rendu de la Cinquiame Session, pp. 5-23, and, for the full code proposed, An-
nexe E, p. 99.
76. This is high enough considering the fact that the landowner, if he
is fearful, may get coverage on his property against the air risk very cheaply.
Nor would the cost of such insurance be excessive. A prominent aviation
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limit might be $10,000 a passenger. 7  This, it will be noticed is as
high as the usual maximum in the death by wrongful act statutes,
and it seems better that the passenger should be assured of pro-
tection up to $10,000 for injuries received than that he should
have merely a possibility (usually only theoretical) of recovering
$50,000.
(b) The Third party Contract-Compulsory insurance
against injury to persons or property on the ground should be
required of all who desire to use the air whether for pleasure or
for commerce. The difficulty with all existing insurance legisla-
tion is that it applies merely to carriers for hire; it does not at-
tempt to reach those independent and irresponsible flyers who
create the greatest menace. The small plane flown by the inex-
perienced flyer will do quite as much damage if it falls into a
crowd of shoppers as the scheduled air liner; and, since it does
not fly on a charted route where landing fields are plentiful, the
danger from forced landings is considerably greater.
Of course, compulsory insurance is not the only method of
guaranteeing financial responsibility. The Swiss law75 permits this
guarantee in the form of an insurance policy, a deposit, or the
posting of a bond, the guarantee to be a condition precedent to
the issuance of a permit of navigation. This statute has been
echoed in Germany75 and in Denmark." A french writer sug-
gests as an alternative the creation of an autonomous fund, like
that which assures the payment of workmen's pensions, to be main-
tained by the contributions of the state and of the owners of air-
insurance broker, writing in a textbook of the aviation industry, has said of
present day public liability and property damage insurance: "The rates on
this insurance (public liability) are very reasonable due to the fact that
very few claims are made and that almost every operator realizes this is a
form of insurance which he must carry for his own protection; for he cannot
tell when an accident may occur and when he will be faced with a law suit
involving large sums. . . . This form of insurance is on a firm founda-
tion today with rates progressively reducing. . . . Rates on Property Dam-
age (which also covers damage from one airplane colliding with another) are
also very low at the present time. Claims have not been substantial and
the insurance companies as a whole have made money not only on this form,
but on Public Liability as well." Mr. J. Brooks Parker in Black, Transport
Aviation (New York, 1929), p. 311.
It is not possible to quote any present rates on this form of insurance
because of the extreme flexibility insurance companies have given to their
aviation rates. There is as yet so little uniformity and so many factors to
be considered in determining a rate-one underwriter has estimated that there
are four hundred distinct factors-that rates must be adapted to the indi-
vidual operator. With absolute liability for the third party risk at present
in force in sixteen or seventeen states it is almost certain that under a com-
pulsory system, with a consequent spreading of the risks and with a simplified
cheaper legal procedure, the rates would be considerably lower.
77. During three years, 1928, 1929 and 1930, "the average fatality or
injury case involved an expenditure of about $10,000 per passenger killed or
injured." "Recent Rulings Affect Passenger Liability Insurance" 2 Skylines
19, 23 (1931).
78. Law of January 27, 1920 (Art. 29).
79. Law of August 1, 1922 (Art. 29).
80. May 1, 1923 (Article 39).
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planes, state assistance to be withdrawn as aviation becomes more
established.81 This plan was devised by its author because the
compulsory insurance idea has not found full favor in France,
but it is quite unlikely that any scheme so paternalistic could at-
tain much popularity at the present time in the United States.
Essentially there would be little difference so far as third
party responsibility went in an insurance policy or a bond.82  It is
only important that there be some guarantee of financial ability
to parties on the ground, and legislation might well permit the post-
ing of a bond or the deposit of a sum of money as meeting the
insurance requirement; provided, of course, that the bond or' de-
posit were sufficiently large to fulfill the purpose for which com-
pulsory insurance was designed. However, insurance would prob-
ably be the most attractive to the aviator.
(c) The Passenger Contract-The various proposals for
passenger insurance have also been not entirely in agreement.
Generally they may be placed in two categories: (1) those which
suggest that the transport companies be required to carry liability
insurance which will indemnify them for any loss they may be
required to pay for injury to a passenger, (2) those which rec-
ommend that a policy on the life of the passenger be attached to
the transport ticket, so that in buying a ticket he automatically
purchases a policy of insurance payable to him in event he is in-
jured, or to his estate in case he is killed, as a result of an accident
occurring on that particular trip. It is this second proposal which
has been the more favored and for good reason.8 3 At the present
time, liability insurance is usually written per passenger seat. Thus,
when a transport company is enjoying capacity business it reaps
the full benefit of its insurance, but when business is slack and
81. Imbrecq, op. cit. note 41, p. 273.
82. This alternative Is permitted in the Louisiana law. Note also the com-
pulsory automobile insurance law of England, discussed in Deak, "Automobile
Accidents: A Comparative Study of the Law of Liability in Europe," 79
Univ. of Pa. Law Rev. 271 (1931).83. Kajtal, "Le Regime des Assurances dans les Transports Aeriens In-
ternationaux," 15 Droit Aerien 589 (1931), and see Loniewski. Assurance et
Responsabilit6 en Matikre de Transport (Paris, 1926).
Mr. W. Jefferson Davis has suggested in this country a similar plan. "If
it is deemed necessary to hold the carrier liable even for unavoidable acci-
dents, that its liability should be limited to, say, $5,000 for injury to any one
person and $100,000 for any one accident, providing further that each pas-
senger may, at his option, pay an additional sum for further protection. .
This compromise would protect the public exceedingly well and would also
enable the carrier to operate." Davis, Aeronautical Law (Los Angeles, 1930),
p. 314.
In Spain, by the decree of August 11, 1928, a consortium of all Spanish
insurance companies was created, each of which was required to make a
deposit of not less than 300,000 pesetas for reserves. Article 10 of the decree
instituted compulsory insurance for the minimum sum of 30,000 pesetas the
passenger to be given full opportunity to subscribe for more. See 214 Boletin
de la Revista General de Legislaecion y Jurisprudencia 581 (Madrid, 1928);
Report of the Huitieme Congr~s International de FAviatiors (Paris, 1928) p.
169; Blum op. cit., p. 339.
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each plane is only partly filled with passengers it pays for insur-
ance from which it derives no benefit.
By means of individual policies of accident insurance the risk
could be much more accurately determined, for it would be based
upon the temporal length of the trip.8 4  This feature would prob-
ably outweigh the objection that such insurance would cost more
to administer. Furthermore, by such insurance, the injured party
would have a direct right against the insurance company. Also,
at the time, of purchasing his ticket, the passenger would have
his attention called to the limitations of the insurance. Then, if
he wished, he would have an opportunity to place what value he
desired upon his life by subscribing to additional, optional insur-
ance. One European writer has suggested that this would ultimately
have a beneficial effect upon insurance business, for it would
habituate the public to insurance ;85 and as this education progressed
the compulsion to insure might be withdrawn.86 But whether one
takes such a sanguine view of the effect upon the public of such an
insurance plan, yet there are obvious advantages in so administer-
ing it.
(d) Proof of Loss-The Establishment of an Accident
Commission-The creation of Industrial Boards to hear causes
arising under the various Workmen's Compensation Acts has sug-
gested a similar device for the administration of compulsory in-
surance. In case of doubt as to the extent of the injuries suffered
the victim would have to submit himself to the examination of
the Board and abide by their decisions. Such decisions would be
made in accord with a fixed schedule of damages. In this way all
cases involving personal injuries to passengers and to parties on
the ground could be settled without going into court. It is in-
evitable that the creation of such a board of experts would not
84. Such policies would be similar to those which are now offered to
railroad passengers. If the air trip for which the passenger purchased his
ticket would be completed within the day the insurance would have a coin-
cident duration. Basing the cost of the insurance on the actual length of
the trip, although more precise, would perhaps be impracticable.
85. Kaftal, op. cit. note 83, at p. 612.
86. Kaftal, op. cit. note 20, p. 44. M. Kaftal's plan would have two
purposes: (1) to guard against the carelessness of the travelers who do not
bother to contract insurance on short and popular lines where accidents are
rare; (2) to serve as advertising for air transportation. He would have the
amount of the insurance vary inversely with the dangers of the trip. The
explanation of this seemingly paradoxical view lies in the fact that the trav-
eler is more likely to decline Insurance when the flight contemplated is short
than when it is long and dangerous. For M. Kaftal does not recommend that
compulsory insurance be permanently established, but that it be maintained
until such a time as the public becomes educated to insurance.
Under such a system as he proposes, proof of liability would involve
only (1) proof of the contract and of the sum of the insurance, and (2)
proof of catastrophe to the airplane on which the insured was a passenger.
The passenger would be indemnified to the limit of the policy even though
he were only slightly hurt.
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only save court costs but would result in a much finer brand of
justice.
(e) The Compulsory Nature of Airplane Insurance-
Gen. John F. O'Ryan, the President of the Colonial Airway Sys-
tem, has suggested the passage of a federal act, providing that
every interstate and foreign airplane company which would secure
from a certified insurance company a policy guaranteeing to the
next of kin of every passenger killed $5,000 and to each passenger
injured indemnity not to exceed $4,000 in accordance with a pre-
pared table of injuries-that every such company would be exempt
from liability 7 This proposal is significant as an answer to the
assertion, often heard, that the transport companies fear compulsory
insurance because it would tend to raise transportation costs. The
only criticism of the act which he suggests is that it should not be
merely a device by means of which the transport companies might
avoid liability if they chose, but that it should be a condition to
plane registration, or to the grant of some federal certificate of
convenience and necessity to be developed in the future. Primarily
the purpose of such a law should be to guarantee to the passenger
certain indemnity for his injuries and security to his next of kin,
and this would only be effectively done if it were made mandatory;
for it is the small irresponsible transport companies, the "stock
selling enterprises"8 8 of which Gen. O'Ryan has spoken, that are
the greatest danger to the passengers. They operate perhaps with
inferior equipment and inferior personnel. They would be the last
voluntarily to adopt such a scheme as Gen. O'Ryan has suggested,
yet they are the most likely to be insolvent and unable to pay dam-
ages assessed against them. It is the irresponsible companies and
the irresponsible private pilots at whom any insurance plan must
be directed, and with such the insurance must be obligatory if it
is to provide security.
(2) The Constitutionality of Compulsory Insurance-We
have discussed already the constitutionality of assessing liability
upon a purely causal basis. The question may now be raised as to
whether the limitation of damages to a fixed maximum sum could
be upheld. Constitutional provisions against limiting damages for
death or injury exist in Arizona," Arkansas, 0 Kentucky,9 1 Penn-
sylvania, 92 and Wyoming,91 and against limiting damages for death
87. O'Ryan, "Limitation of Aircraft Liability," 3 Air Law Rev. 27 (1932).
88. See note 73.
89. Article II, See. 31.
90. Article B, See. 32.
91. Section 54.
92. Article III, Sec. 21.
93. Article X, Sec. 4.
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alone in New York, 4 Ohio, 5 Oklahoma, " and Utah.9 7  In these
states amendments were required to make 'possible Workmen's
Compensation Acts." One comes regretfully to the decision that
other amendments would be necessary to permit the limitation of
damages in airplane cases by state legislation.
But it would be no good objection to the plan that it required
insurance of airplane liability without placing a similar obligation
on proprietors of automobiles or railroad companies.9 Nor would
it be a violation of the due process clause to require the public
to accept such a law.10° Nor, finally, would the substitution of a
commission for a jury be an invalid act. 10 '
Arguments of Policy Against Compulsory Insurance:
(1) The Compulsory Automobile Insurance Analogy-Com-
pulsory insurance has been too often dismissed with the observa-
tion that it was a failure when applied to automobiles. Only one
94. Article I, Sec. 18.
95. Article I, See. 19a.
96. Article XXIII, Sec. 7.
97. Article XVI, Sec. 5.
98. Arizona, Article XVIII, See. 8 (1925) ; New York, Article I, See. 19
(1913); Ohio, Article If. Sec. 35 (1923); Pennsylvania, Article III, Sec. 21
(1915) ; and Wyoming, Article X, Sec. 4 (1914).
99. In Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205 (1888), Mr.
Justice Field said, in upholding a Kansas statute which held railroad com-
panies liable for damage to employees done by the negligence of agents of the
company: "When legislation applies to particular bodies or associations, im-
posing upon them additional liabilities, It is not open to the objection that
it denies to them the equal protection of the laws, if all persons brought
under its influence are treated alike under the same conditions."
In 1915 Mr. Justice Hughes, in holding valid a California statute which
prohibited the employment of women In hotels for more than eight hours a
day, asserted: "The legislature is not debarred from classifying according
to general considerations and with regard to prevailing conditions; otherwise,
there could be no legislative power to classify. Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S.
373, 382. 35 Sup. Ct. 342 (1915).
In discussing a proposed compulsory insurance law for automobiles the
Massachusetts court has said: "We understand the inquiry presented by the
second question to mean, whether the selection of owners of motor vehicles as
alone required to provide security for injuries caused by such property violates
the Constitution. The proposed statute omits from such requirement the
owners of horse drawn vehicles and of electric railways and steam railroads
and the operators of motor vehicles who are not also owners. Reasonable
classification in the selection of subjects for legislation is always permissible
to the lawmaking power." In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, at
p. 600, 147 N. E. 681 (1925).
In Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 50 Sup. Ct. 57 (1929), it was held that
a Connecticut statute which provided that no gratuitous guest in an auto-
mobile could recover from the owner or operator for injuries caused by neg-
ligent operation was not violative of equal protection, although it made a
distinction between automobile passengers and those in other kinds of vehicles.
100. "So long as a substantial and efficient remedy remains or is provided
due process is not denied by a legislative change." Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S.
142, 147, 42 Sup. Ct. 214 (1922). See also Middletown v. Texas Power &
Light Co., 249 U. S. 152, 39 Sup. Ct. 227 (1919), where it was held that an
employee be deprived of his common law action and remitted to his claim
under the compensation plan.
101. It was generally found In the case of the Workmen's Compensation
Acts that where the act was elective as to the employee as well as the em-
ployer there was no difficulty: Foster v. Morse, 132 Mass. 354 (1882). Sus-
taining compulsory acts under police power courts held that the right to
establish the plan necessarily carried with it the right to require the em-
ployees to accept it. State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101 (1911)
State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 135 Pac. 645 (1913).
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state has experimented with true compulsory insurance'0 2 and the
evidence is not conclusive that the experiment has failed.10 3  But
the experience of Massachusetts is here quite beside the point for
the criticisms which have 'been leveled at that legislation clearly
do not apply to the proposed plan for compulsory airplane insur-
ance.
The main objections made to the Massachusetts plan are three:
(1) that it has encouraged recklessness; (2) that it has denied to
the insurance companies the prerogative of choosing their risks;
(3) that it has resulted in a rise rather than in a decrease in rates.
Concerning the first charge it is quite enough to say that the
knowledge that he has insurance will hardly inspire an aviator to
be indifferent to innocent parties on the ground or to passengers.
Even the most irresponsible airman is unlikely to risk his own life
merely because he feels himself exempt from financial responsibility.
Furthermore, negligence, although it lose its civil significance, will
yet remain a penal offense. With increased efficiency in the admin-
istration of state and federal regulations this will become a serious
deterrent to recklessness.
Neither will the transport companies relax in their insistence
upon care. The cost of insurance will be computed partly upon
the past character of the company for care. A large number of
accidents will result in a costly insurance, the effect being either
to check the negligence of the transport companies or to drive them
out of competition. And it is obvious that no transport company
102. Liability insurance Is required for every motor vehicle driven on
English highways (20021 Geo. V, Ch. 43). It is required also in Finland(Suomen Asetus Kokoelma 1925, 557, No. 148), In Norway (Stat. of Feb. 20
1926; Lovom Motor-Voguer), in Denmark (Stat. of Mar. 20, 1918, as amended
June 30, 1921), and In several of the cantons of Switzerland. See Blum, op.
cit. note 8, p. 337, and Report of the Committee to Study Compensation for
Automobile Accidents, p. 212. In 1928 the Interstate Commerce Commission
reported that forty states then required motor vehicles which are common
carriers of passengers to insure: Report No. 18,300 of Apr. 10, 1928. And
see Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257 (1923) for the opinion
sustaining the New York Statute.
103. The arguments against the Massachusetts plan may all be found in
the following list of books and pamphlets: Towle, Compulsory Automobile
Liability Insurance (Philadelphia, 1929), p. 4; Foster, Some Problems Aris-
ing out of Automobile Safety Responsibility Laws (Toronto, 1930), p. 6;
Interim Report on Compulsory Insurance and Safety Responsibility Laws by
Royal Commission on Automobile Insurance Premium Rates (Toronto, 1930),
p. 14 ; Stone, Massachusetts: Unfair Motor Law (pamphlet reprint from
Aug. 1929 issue of Federation News) ; Compulsory Automobile Insurance(published by Chamber of Commerce, Washington, 1926) : Compulsory Auto-
mobile Insurance (pamphlet issued by Association of Casualty and Surety Ex-
ecutives) ; Lott, "Financial Responsibility of Automobile Drivers," 14 Proceed-
ings of Casualty Actuarial Society (May 25, 1928) ; Report of Committee of
Nine on Financial Responsibility for Automobile Accidents (F. Robertson
Johes, N. Y. City, 1926).
In reply to the assertion that compulsory insurance in Massachusetts has
encouriaged recklessness, note the following langauge from the Report of the
Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents: "The Committee
after a careful study of the available figures from Massachusetts and from
other states, can find no satisfactory evidence that compulsory liability insur-
ance has affected highway safety In either direction" (p. 211).
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will encourage conduct that must result in the destruction of its
own equipment. Nor will -any transport company wish to incur
a bad reputation for safety, since with the wide newspaper publicity
given to air crashes, it is incumbent upon transport companies to
be as cautious as possible.
Finally, it must be remembered that aviators have to have li-
censes, and that air lines have to conform to certain standards of
equipment and safety in order to obtain certificates of convenience
and necessity. The air transport company and the private plane
owner are in a very different position from the proprietor of a
private automobile, who may drive any kind of car 'so long as it
runs and who is generally held to no standard of ability. 10
Despite the fact that experience with insurance has produced
no increase in carelessness on the part of the insured 0 5 the pro-
ponents of compulsory airplane insurance schemes have shown
considerable ingenuity in devising deterrents to negligence. One
writer has proposed that the airplane operator pay part of the
cost of every accident. Foe that part the insurance company
would have a secondary liability, so that the injured party would be
protected no matter what the condition of the transport company.1°0
This is approximately the plan in force in the Canton of Vaud in
Switzerland in administering automobile insurance. 0 7 Another has
proposed that when the injury has occurred through some negli-
gence on the part of the transport company the passenger may
sue that company to recover for his injury above the amount of
the insurance policy.' 08 The difficulty with this system is, of course,
that it does not dispense with a court investigation of the accident,
and the impracticability of shifting evidence of negligence from
the ashes of a wrecked plane remains.
As for compulsory insurance robbing the insurance companies
of their right to choose their risks, that is a criticism only of the
plan as developed in Massachusetts."0 9 There a state board decides
whether the company is obliged to accept a certain risk, and the
decrees of that board are enforced under penalty of excluding the
104. Except, of course, in those states which require driver's licenses.
Even so the ability required to obtain an automobile driver's license may not
be compared with the ability which must be manifested by the aviator before
he is permitted to fly away from the airport.
105. In Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. and H. Ry Co., 223 U. S. 1, 51, 32 Sup. Ct.
169 (1912), there is Judicial recognition of the fact that absolute liability of
employers to employees tends to cut down accidents.
106. Loniewski, op. cit. note 83. pp. 100, 101.
107. Towle, op cit. note 103, p. 8.
108. Prochasson, op. cit. note 8.
109. This is apparently the greatest fear of the insurance companies. In
correspondence with the author they have expressed an adamantine insistence
that the privilege of selection should never be waived.
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company from the state."" But manifestly it is possible to estab-
lish a system which permits to insurance companies an alternative
higher rate for proven bad risks, a system wherein history may
be a decisive factor in determining the amount of the premium.
And Federal licenses both for aircraft and aviators-enforced
with state assistance"'-promise a degree of uniformity in physical
equipment and skill of manipulation. The companies insuring air-
plane risks will never be required to accept patronage indiscrim-
inately as the automobile insurance companies have been in Mas-
sachusetts, where anyone who passes a perfunctory test may drive
a car.
In Massachusetts admittedly there has been an increase in in-
surance rates since the inauguration of compulsory insurance. The
reasons assigned for this increase are: first, that the loss cost per
car is higher since the insurance companies are not permitted to
reject poor drivers; and, second, that the known existence of in-
surance has suggested innumerable unreasonable and false claims.
The first of these conditions is the necessary consequence of a sys-
tem which does not admit the record of the insured as a factor in
determining the premium rate. With an increased rate provided
for all aviators who had had previous accidents the loss cost would
be better apportioned, so that no general increase in rate would re-
sult over the rate for optional insurance. Nor could false and un-
reasonable claims be made so easily by third parties and passengers
as they could by victims of automobile accidents. In the case of
injury to property (not provided for under the Massachusetts
statute) that damage would remain accessible to the scrutiny of
the underwriters; for the property on the ground which a falling
airplane is most likely to destroy is usually, unlike automobiles, of
an immobile nature. Furthermore, the very fact that airplane
accidents generally have serious consequences makes false personal
injury claims less possible. Parties are more often killed than
injured in airplane crashes, and such accidents are, as yet, of such
infrequent occurrence as to permit immediate examination by the
insurance companies, and proof before a commission of experts is
something quite different from proof before a credulous emotional
jury.
110. The Committee to Study Compensation reports that: "In the first
four years under the law, of approximately 1,100 complaints filed, less than
300 were decided against companies after hearing or on default. During this
period more than 800,000 motor vehicles were registered annually." But the
Committee Is quick in suggesting that probably the companies accepted risks
In the first place which they would have rejected had there been no Board of
Appeal. Report of Committee, p. 210.
111. Twenty-four states now require Federal licenses for all aircraft and
airmen.
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Different from the Massachusetts law are the so-called finan-
cial responsibility plans.1 12  Perhaps the most successful of these,
the Stone Plan, in force in New Hampshire since 1927, provides
that, if an automobile owner is sued, the court will immediately
inquire into his financial abilty, and, if he gives no security for the
payment of the damage, his license is forthwith suspended, to be
revoked if the final judgment goes against him, unless and until
he satisfies that judgment. Somewhat similar in spirit, the Con-
necticut law, which was adopted in 1926, provides that, when any
automobile driver is involved in any accident causing death or
injury or property damage exceeding fifty dollars, he may be re-
quired by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to prove his ability
to pay damages in any future accident either by insurance or by a
surety bond or by a deposit with the State Treasurer of securities
or cash in an amount satisfactory to the Commissioner. After
that person has maintained a clean record for three years he may
be reinstated.
One sees easily that the purpose of such legislation as this
differs materially from that of any of the contemplated airplane
insurance schemes. The intent of the financial security laws is
to rule off the road the irresponsible driver who has already caused
a wreck and to encourage voluntary subscribing for insurance.
Such a plan applied to aviation would effectively lock the stable
only after the horse had been stolen. Airplane accidents result
often in the death of the operator, and, if the man on the ground
and the passenger are to be safeguarded, they must be assured
remuneration for the first disaster. The airplane should not, like
the dog, be permitted one bite.
(2) Other Arguments of Policy's-In Europe, where dis-
112. Also there Is the compensation plan in its several manifestations,
the Marx plan, the Cuvillier Bill, and the Jones Bill. Perhaps the most com-
prehensive study of the compensation idea is contained in The Report by the
Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents (Philadelphia,
1932). Considerable material from that source has been used In the present
article. See also, for detailed criticism of the Marx Plan: Sherman, A Criti-
cism of Proposals for Compulsory Motor Vehicle Compensation Insurance (N.
Y., 1929); Sherman, Compensation for Automobile Accidents (N. Y., 1928);
and Ives, Compulsory Liability Insurance with Particular Reference to Auto-
mobile Insurance (Chicago, 1924).
113. Examples of the frivolous arguments that have been made against
compulsory passenger insurance are these: (1) that insurance companies are
not always solvent (Dor, "Le Problbme de l'Assurance en Matlre de Navi-
gation Adrienne," 11 Rev. Jur. Inter. do la Nay. A6rienne 5 (1927)); (2) that
any compulsion must result in a loss of liberty for the insurance companies(Le Gall, "Quelques Experiences Recentes en Matire d'Assurance Obligatoire,"
13 Droit Aerien 3, 5; Blum, op. cit. note 8, p. 337); (3) that for the rich
obligatory insurance would be inadequate and that for the poor it would be
too expensive (Roubler, "Les Assurances A6riennes," 9 Rev. Jur. de la L. A.
322 (1925)); (4) that many passengers who are already insured would want
no new insurance (C. J. I. A., Seventh Congress, p. 157) ; (5) that by making
insurance compulsory you admit the risks (Ibid., p. 227); (6) and, finally,
that the customers of aviation are superstitious and would think that an
accident would inevitably follow if they insured (Ibid., p. 140).
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tances are short and international rivalries intense, the fear has
been often expressed that it would be unwise for any one country
to compel a guarantee of responsibility from its airmen, without
an assurance of similar action on the part of neighboring coun-
tries . 4  This international objection has been one of the loudest
arguments against compulsory insurance. In the United States
parallel conditions demand uniform state laws 15 or federal leg-
islation requiring insurance."' The widespread adoption of the
old Uniform Aeronautics Act indicates the practicability of con-
sistent state action.117 And the development of state registration
and licensing is a contribution to the easy enforcement of insurance
laws.
Whenever mention of compulsory airplane insurance is made
to the insurance companies, their stock reply is that any legisla-
tion now would be premature. They have as yet had too little
experience in underwriting the airplane risks. That this argu-
ment is not the unique discovery of the American companies is
indicated by these observations of M. Kaftal:
"While the learned assembly of jurists discoursed on the impossibility
or prematurity . . . of these forms of insurance in their application to
aviation, the big air navigation companies, wishing to free themselves from
their uncertain liability, without discouraging travelers in depriving them
of the possibility of obtaining compensation for their injuries, applied
compulsory insurance to their passengers, both automatically and without
adding to the price of tickets. By the simple act of buying a ticket the
passenger found himself insured for the sum of 150,000 francs in France
and for 25,000 Reichmarks in Germany. These insurances have functioned
for several years on all lines in Germany, in Austria (Oesterreichische
Luftverkehrs-A. G.) in Switzerland (Societe 'Ad Astra') and in France
(C. I. D. N. A.) and what should be remembered is that, despite the fear
expressed by many jurists, one must believe that the premiums have not
been very important, since the air navigation companies have been able
to insure the passengers without making them pay either directly or in-
directly, that is, without raising the price of the tickets."118
In the United States also, in spite of their protests, three large
insurance pools and an old independent company are soliciting air-
114. Blum, op. cit. note 8, p. 340. And see Ambrosini, "Llabilty for
Damages Caused by Aircraft on the Ground: A Proposed International Code,"
3 Air Law Review 1 (1932).
115. As to the rights of a state to require Insurance for interstate car-
riers, see George Motor Carrier Regulation in the United States (Sparten-
burg, 1929) pp. f26-228.
116. On the question of federal power over Intrastate aviation under the
Pan American Convention see "Report of the Standing Committee on Aero-
nautical Law of the American Bar Association, October, 1932," 3 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 632, 637 (1932).
117. The need for such uniformity is obvious; see note 75,
118. Kaftal, op. cit. note 20, p. 42. See various continental authors for
expressionis of this same objection: Dor, op. cit. note 113, p. 3; Blum. op.
cit. nQte 8. p. 838.
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plane risks. Every well-organized airline today carries coverage
on all of its liabilities," 9 and the private flyer may secure insurance
on the third party risk at reasonable cost. Insurers give varying
estimates as to the number of years necessary before rates may
be placed on a strictly actuarial basis,' 20 but they admit that De-
partment of Commerce statistics are a considerable aid. Liability
insurance is now written "against loss by reason of the liability
imposed by law." Although the re-definition of "the liability im-
posed by law" to mean all loss would, of course, increase the cost
of the insurance, yet, at the same time it would enable the insurer
to establish his premium rates more nearly on a claims costs basis.
For, at the present time, the point of greatest uncertainty is not
the occurrence of the accident itself but the action of the jury.
To the transport companies it should be said that there is a
considerable advertising value in insurance, that compulsory insur-
ance would be an incentive for the calm acceptance of aviation by
the public. The truth of this assertion is implicit in the experi-
ence of a German company. When the Lufthansa first voluntarily
contracted policies of insurance on passengers the gesture was
resented by other air lines who saw in it only a motive of com-
petition. Subsequent events revealed that this policy increased busi-
ness .21  The other companies were quick to imitate the Lufthansa.
The establishment of insurance rates is admittedly difficult.1
2
119. In reply to a question as to the usual amount of liability insurance
carried by transport companies per passenger seat one insurer stated. "Or-
dinarily $10,000 but as high as $50,000; another $25,000; a third "$40,000, as
there have been settlements made in excess of $30,000 ;" and a fourth $50,000.
A textbook, analyzing the disbursements of transport companies in 1924, as-
serted that insurance formed 30% of the cost of operation. Kennedy, Intro-
duction to the Economics of Air Transportation (New York, 1924) p. 54.
Insurance coverage on a plane owned by an insurance company represents
twenty per cent of the operating cost. Brednouw, "An Analysis of Operation
Costs," 3 Southern Aviation 13 (July, 1932). See also Dwerlkotte. "Tracking
Down Maintenance Expenses," 31 Aviation 257 (June, 1932).
For a discussion of the insurance now available see Crowdus, "Aviation
Insurance," 2 JOURNAL OF AiR LAW 184, and Sweeney, "Tendencies in the
Insurance of Aviation Hazards." 161 The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 111 (1932).
120. One insurer suggested that it would require four years more. Others
were disinclined to prognosticate because of the rapidity witfr which technique
and equipment develop; although one suggested that "In order to develop a
proper experience for rate making purposes in automobile insurance it was
necessary to have figures showing the operation of 50,000 cars over a period
of three years in one particular locality." Recently an association of the
principal insurance writers was organized and it is to be hoped that this
cooperative gesture will speed results.
121. Ddring, Die Luftversicherung Entwicklung, Recht und Technlk (Ber-
lin, 1928) p. 123. It is important to notice that the C. 1. D. N. A. in France
and the Lufthansa in Germany have found that insurance for the sum of
150,000 francs costs but nine per cent of the ticket price. Kaftal, "Le R~gime
des Assurances dans les TrAnsports ACrlens Internationaux," 15 Droit A~rlen
589, 612 (1931).
122. "A well-known underwriter recently stated, as his opinion, that there
were over four hundred different factors to take into consideration in the
handling of aircraft risks. When we couple this with the understanding that
statistics, up to the present, have not been gathered in a standardized manner,
except by the insurance carriers themselves, it is easier to understand the
difficulties faced in securing commensurated premiums properly to take care
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But it does not necessarily follow that such rates must be prohibi-
tive. The air line today which carries liability insurance offers
to its patrons a very tenuous protection, a protection contingent
upon the dexterity of a judge at pouring new wine into old bottles
and upon the collective whim of a bewildered jury. With personal
policies made integral with the transport ticket the passenger would
have an absolutely certain quantum of protection and he might
buy frankly as much more protection as he liked. And with ob-
ligatory third party insurance, aviation would be made safe for the
public.
The airplane is distinct from other mediums of transportation
and it is on the recognition of this fact that the intelligent growth
of air law depends. Rules designed for the railroads and for au-
tomobiles should not be blindly applied to airplanes. Air trans-
portation requires not only a new technique of operation but a new
regulatory technique, a new law'2 8 And a new law may never be
created out of shopworn analogies and faded precedents, but only
out of imagination.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS.
(1) As to the risk to persons and property on the ground, It
Is Recommended:
(a) That aviators be held absolutely liable for damage
to persons and property on the ground;
(b) That this liability be limited to certain fixed
amounts;
(c) That all aviators be required to guarantee by a
bond, a deposit of money, or an insurance
policy, financial responsibility to the limits set
by (b).
(2) As to the passenger risk, It Is Recommended:
(a) That transport companies be permitted to con-
tract away all liability to passengers up to cer-
tain limits established by legislation ;124
of the hazards." Doyle, "Underwriting Aviation Insurance," 15 Aero Digest
87 (September, 1929).
123. If compulsory insurance has not been practiced before it is because
the principle of obligation constituted a new stage "of judicial technique which
the state of civilization has not yet been able to attain. The growing com-
plexity of society, the intricacy of the most diverse risks, the greatest need
for security will conduce without doubt to the practice of compulsory insur-
ance." Le Gall, "Quelques Experiences Recentes en Matire d'Assurance
Obligatoire," 13 Droit A~rien 2 (1929).
124. On the advisability of following the plan of limitation of liability
suggested by the Warsaw Convention see Knauth, "Limitation of Aircraft
Owner's Liability," 3 Air Law Review 135 (1932). For a copy of the Con-
vention itself see McNair. The Law of the Air (London, 1932) Appendix D,
p. 201.
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(b) That all transport companies be required to in-
clude in the transport ticket a policy of insur-
ance payable upon the injury or death of the
passenger;
(c) That additional insurance be made available to
the passenger at his option at a reasonable
charge;
(d) That insurance companies be permitted to con-
sider the history of the applicant transport
company in determining the cost of the insur-
ance.
(3) General. It Is Recommended:
(a) That all aviation insurance claims be provable in
cases of disputes before a commission estab-
lished for that purpose. 125
125. In some states the established state aviation commissions might be
found well qualified to assume jurisdiction of such disputes.
